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PROPERTY OWNER'S LIABILITY FOR
NEGLIGENCE IN CREATING A CONDITION
CONDUCIVE TO CRIMINAL ASSAULT
In Johnston v. Harris1 an elderly tenant of defendant's four-unit
apartment building in Detroit's inner city brought a negligence ac-
tion to recover damages for injuries sustained when he was assaulted,
struck and robbed by an unknown youth in the poorly-lighted, un-
locked vestibule of his apartment building. The Supreme Court of
Michigan held that a tenant's action may lie against a landlord on
the theory that the landlord was negligent in creating a condition
conducive to criminal assault by failing to provide adequate lighting
and locks.' The court concluded that plaintiff had presented a prima
facie case: the landlord had a duty to provide adequate porch and
vestibule lighting and to maintain the lock on the front door in
good repair, and he had breached that duty.3 The controlling issue
was whether the landlord's breach of duty was the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries.4 The lower court's directed verdict for defendant
was reversed and remanded for a new trial.5
With no discussion, the Supreme Court of Michigan imposed upon
the landlord the duty to provide some protection against criminal
attack. Traditionally, however, an individual has no duty to act
affirmatively to prevent injury to another caused by a third person,6
nor any obligation to anticipate third-party criminal activity.7 The
scope of the landlord's duty does not normally embrace the kind of
injury resulting from such third-party acts.8 Without a showing of a
1. 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
2. Id. at 575, 198 N.W.2d at 411.
3. Id. at 575-76, 198 N.W.2d at 411.
4. Id. at 572-73, 198 N.W.2d at 410.
5. Id. at 576, 198 N.W.2d at 411.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
7. See, e.g., Tirado v. Lubarsky, 49 Misc. 2d 543, 544, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.), aff'd, 52 Misc. 2d 527, 276 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. T. 1966).
8. Kobeski v. Judkowitz, 57 Lack. Jur. 37, 39-40 (C.P. Lackawanna County,
Pa. 1956).
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breach of statutory,9 or contractual obligation,10 or of negligence
constituting proximate cause of injury, an action cannot lie. No ques-
tion of breach of statutory or contractual obligation was raised in
Johnston, and the issue of whether the landlord-tenant relationship
imposes a duty upon the landlord to provide his tenants with rea-
sonable security from predictable crimes has in fact received little
judicial inquiry. Those few cases that have considered the problem
generally absolved the landlord by finding either an absence of legal
duty1 or lack of proximate cause.12
Perhaps the overriding reason for refusal to impose liability was
that the landlord-tenant relationship was still so intimately tied to
property law concepts as to negate the idea that the relationship it-
self created a duty of care. 3 Under the traditional principles of prop-
erty law, a lease is not thought of as creating a relationship wherein
9. Statutes or regulations requiring landlords to maintain their premises in a
"safe" condition have been construed to refer exclusively to the physical condition
of the premises. Generally, therefore, no statutory duty has been imposed upon the
landlord to provide protection against the criminal activities of third persons.
See Williams v. William J. Davis, Inc., 275 A.2d 231 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1971);
New York City Housing Authority v. Medlin, 57 Misc. 2d 145, 291 N.Y.S.2d
672 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968); DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc.
2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1965).
10. Using a contract theory, one court held a landlord obligated to maintain
security measures equivalent to those in effect at the commencement of the lease
term. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). Other courts, however, have rejected the contention that a landlord's
duty to protect his tenants against criminal activity was imposed by express or
implied contractual terms. See Teall v. Harlow, 275 Mass. 448, 176 N.E. 533
(1931); New York City Housing Authority v. Medlin, 57 Misc. 2d 145, 291
N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968).
11. No duty to protect was found in: Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38
N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); New York City Housing Authority v. Jackson,
58 Misc. 2d 847, 296 N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968); Kobesli v. Judkowitz,
57 Lack. Jur. 37 (C.P. Lackawanna County, Pa. 1956).
12. There was a failure to establish proximate cause in the following cases:
Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926); DeFoe v. Sloane, 99
A.2d 639 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953); Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J.
578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); McCappin v. Park Capitol Corp., 42 N.J. Super.
169, 126 A.2d 51 (App. Div. 1956); Levin v. Eleto Realty Corp., 160 Misc. 141,
289 N.Y.S. 667 (App. T. 1936); New York City Housing Authority v. Jackson, 58
Misc. 2d 847, 296 N.Y.S.2d 237 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968); Tirado v. Lubarsky,
49 Misc. 2d 543, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.), aff'd, 52 Misc. 2d 527, 276
N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. T. 1966); DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc.
2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1965).
13. Comment, Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 16 VILL.
L. Rnv. 779, 782 (1971).
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one party becomes subservient to the other, but rather is considered
to be only a single transaction in which one party conveys an estate
in land to another for a specified term. This traditional rationale,
however, becomes untenable in the modem multiple-dwelling con-
text where a continuing relationship is a necessity due to the tenant's
continuing need for services and the landlord's exclusive control in
providing them.24 Although traditionally a tenant takes the premises
as he finds them,15 Johnston adopted the rationale, used in Kline v.
1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 6 that the landlord was
the "only party who has the power to make the necessary repairs or
to provide the necessary protection,"' 7 in order to include the land-
lord-tenant relationship in the category of "special relationships"
and to impose the duty of due care to protect tenants from predict-
able criminal acts.
Where there is a legal obligation to protect a "subservient party"
from criminal attack, social necessity and judicial determination have
recognized certain special relationships.', When such a relationship
is found to exist, liability is based on the fact that the ability of one
party to protect himself has been limited by his submission to the
control or ownership in another. As a result, the party possessing
superior control is burdened with a duty of exercising reasonable
care to protect the subservient party.", Special relationships in which
the duty has been imposed include landowner-invitee,20 innkeeper.
guest,21 business proprietor-patron,22 employer-employee,23 carrier-
14. Id.
15. See Civale v. Menden Housing Authority, 150 Conn. 594, 192 A.2d 548
(1963).
16. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
17. Id. at 481.
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 314A (1965), comment b,
quoted at note 26 infra.
19. See Comment, Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., supra
note 13, at 781.
20. See, e.g., Harry Poretsky & Sons, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 235 F.2d 295 (4th Cir.
1956).
21. See McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 56, 46 N.E.2d 573
(1943); Coca v. Arceo, 71 N.M. 186, 376 P.2d 970 (1962).
22. See Williams v. Essex Amusement Corp., 133 N.J.L. 218, 43 A.2d 828
(Sup. Ct. 1945); Connelly v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 261, 37 A.2d 125
(1944).
23. See Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947).
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passenger,2 4 and school district-pupil.2 Liability, however, was not
meant to be confined to these narrow categories. 26
Johnston followed a path set by Javins v. First National Realty
Corp.27 when it recognized the changed nature of the landlord-tenant
relationships. Unlike New York Housing Authority v. Jackson,28
which had denied the existence of a legal duty to supply police pro-
tection in the absence of some "relationship" between the parties
creating a duty to use due care, Johnston impliedly recognized that
a tenant in a typical multiple-family dwelling relies upon the control
and power of the landlord to assure his security in the common areas
of the building at least as much as the "subservient party" in any
of the above-recognized "special relationships." The imposition of a
duty on the landlord to provide for reasonable protection of his
tenants is an important step in the changing judicial conception of
the modem landlord's obligations.
To aid the finding of a special relationship exception to the gen-
eral rule, Johnston utilized the doctrine of a landlord's "exclusive
control" to impose liability on the landlord. The doctrine was clearly
extended to include injuries from foreseeable criminal acts, in addi-
tion to injuries caused by physical defects on the premises, in Kline
v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp.2 9 Some courts impose a
duty on the landlord to exercise reasonable care in keeping common
areas in a safe condition, 0 the rationale being that a landlord is
24. See Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1967), Cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968).
25. See McLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d
360 (1953).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965), comment b states:
"The duties stated in this Section arise out of special relations between the
parties, which create a special responsibilty, and take the case out of the general
rule. The relations listed are not intended to be exclusive." (Emphasis added.)
27. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
28. 58 Misc. 2d 847, 849, 296 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968).
29. Kline caused a flurry of case comments, including 1970 DuKE L.J. 1046;
59 GEo. L.J. 1153 (1971); 55 MiNN. L. REv. 1097 (1971); 45 N.Y.U. L. REv.
943 (1970); 49 TExAs L. Rlv. 586 (1971); 32 U. PITT. L. REv. 267 (1971); 5
U. SAN FRANcisco L. REv. 378 (1971); 24 VAND. L. Rlv. 195 (1970); 15 VILL.
L. REv. 195 (1970); 16 VILL. L. REv. 779 (1971).
30. E.g., Levine v. Katz, 407 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Mayer v. Housing
Authority, 84 N.J. Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (App. Div. 1964), aff'd per curiam,
44 N.J. 567, 210 A.2d 617 (1965). Some of the relevant factors of reasonable
care under all the circumstances are: the crime rate in the city, in the area, and
on the landlord's premises; tenants' complaints; number of tenancies; the amount
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presumed to have retained control over those parts of the premises
used in common by the tenants. 31 Therefore, if the landlord "[klnows,
or in the exercise of ordinary care ought to know, of a possibly
dangerous situation and fails to take such steps as an ordinarily
prudent person, in view of existing circumstances, would have
exercised to avoid injury to his tenant, he may be liable." 32 The
emerging trend is to impose a duty to provide some reasonable mea-
sure of care and protection to tenants with respect to foreseeable
criminal conduct.- Thus, where the landlord is the only party who
has the power to make the necessary security provisions without which
criminal activity is foreseeable,34 or where the property owner has
knowledge that his property is frequented by dangerous characters,'
3
or has knowledge of other conditions which are likely to result in an
assault or constitute a potential source of danger of criminal attack, 6
the duty of reasonable care has been imposed.
The Johnston court directed itself primarily to a discussion of the
second of the two basic issues, proximate causation.- The court was
concerned with two aspects of proximate cause. First, was the land-
lord's failure to secure the premises a proximate cause of the tenant's
of rent paid; nature and quality of accommodations; and expressed and implied
warranties as to the safety of the premises. Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect
Tenants from Criminal Acts of Third Parties: The View from 1500 Massachusetts
Avenue, 59 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1180 (1971).
31. See Primus v. Bellevue Apartments, 241 Iowa 1055, 44 N.W.2d 347
(1950).
32. This test was adopted in Kline, 439 F.2d at 484-85, as it had been set out
in Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (land-
lord held liable when his employee, whom the landlord had failed to investigate,
strangled the young woman tenant whose apartment he was painting).
33. See Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1969)
(landlord said to be under a duty to exercise reasonable care with respect to the
prevention, deterrence, or control of foreseeable criminal conduct within those parts
of the apartment building used in common by all tenants). See also Bass v. City of
New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (municipal hous-
ing authority liable in tort for the death of a nine-year-old girl who was raped,
tortured and dropped to her death while the lone policeman assigned to the crime-
ridden complex was out to lunch). The case was later reversed on the grounds
of governmental tort immunity, 38 App. Div. 2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972).
34. 439 F.2d at 481.
35. See Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947).
36. See Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943);
Abbott v. New York City Pub. Library, 263 App. Div. 314, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963
(1942).
37. For cases finding lack of proximate cause see note 12 supra.
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injuries? Secondly, did the intervening criminal attack constitute
a superseding cause,28 severing the causal connection between the
tenant's injury and any breach of the landlord's duty? Whether
liability was imposed depended on whether the court took a narrow
or broad view of proximate cause.
According to the narrow view, the injury must be a natural and
continual sequence of the wrongful act complained of, "'unbroken
by any new cause ... and without which that even would not have
occurred."-89 Following this view, it has been held that the landlord's
failure to repair a front-door lock was insufficient evidence to estab-
lish proximate cause of an assault and robbery.40 In another decision
it was found that the unlawful act of an incendiary, rather than the
negligence of a landlord who allowed trash to accumulate in a hall-
way, was the proximate cause of smoke and soot damage to a tenant's
property, and that the landlord had neither control over nor re-
sponsibility for the unlawful acts of others. 41
In Johnston, the lower court apparently treating the action as
based solely upon the narrow theory that the landlord's failure to
provide proper locks and lighting alone caused plaintiff's injuries,
held in favor of the landlord. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in
reversing, took the broader view that foreseeable intervening forces
are within the scope of original risk and therefore within the scope
of the landlord's duty,42 even if that foreseeable intervening force is
38. The Johnston court relied on the definition of superseding cause in Rn-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
39. Tirado v. Lubarsky, 49 Misc. 2d 543, 544, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct.), aff'd, 52 Misc. 2d 527, 276 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. T. 1966), citing
Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73, 99, 52 N.E. 679, 688 (1899).
40. Tirado v. Lubarsky, 49 Misc. 2d 543, 268 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.),
aff'd, 52 Misc. 2d 527, 276 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. T. 1966).
41. DeFoe v. W. & J. Sloane, 99 A.2d 639 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953). see
Applebaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Stelloh v. Cottage 83,
Inc., 52 Ill. App. 2d 168, 201 N.E.2d 672 (1964), in which a complaint was
held defective because of the tenant's failure to allege that the landlord knew
or that the tenant did not know of the prior series of break-ins, burglaries and
rapes in the project. In addition, the court was doubtful that the giving of such
warning about the prior incidents would have lessened the probability of the
crime. See also Benjamin v. Brooklyn Trust Co., 185 Misc. 296, 57 N.Y.S.2d 816
(App. T.), appeal denied, 269 App. Div. 939, 57 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1945), in
which it was held that the landlord could not foresee that one of its employees
would find a missing passkey and enter the apartment to take some of plaintiff's
personal property.
42. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 44, at 273 (4th ed. 1971).
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the criminal act of some third person.4- The court adopted the broad
view of causation of Crammer v. Willston Operating Co.44 in response
to the argument that an omission could not be a cause of an event
if the particular event could have occurred without it. Crammer
stated that although the skating injuries involved therein could have
happened with better supervision, the evidence justified the inference
that "better policing of the rink would have deterred the... skaters
from conduct injurious to others."' 5 Where an omission was a "sub-
stantial factor" causing the injury,46 or where the occurrence was one
"which the defendant should have foreseen and better guarded
against,"' 7 or was a "danger . . . reasonably to be anticipated,"48
proximate cause has been found.
It is recognized that proximate cause, in many cases, is what a
court wills it to be. One court says that, at best, it is a theory under
which the courts justify or shield from liability those that the court
finds, in a particular case, should or should not be responsible for a
given result.49 A court will thus incorporate its policy and its ideas
of reasonableness and fairness into the concept of proximate cause.
It has been said that "in every ... case the basic question is one
of policy;"5' I that whether one person owes a duty or protection to
another is "ultimately a question of fairness." 51 Some of the factors
43. 387 Mich. at 572-73, 198 N.W.2d at 410.
44. 19 N.J. Super. 489, 88 A.2d 630 (App. Div. 1952), wherein a patron at
a skating rink unwittingly upset two young ladies. The question raised was
whether there were sufficient ushers present to protect patrons from skating condi-
tions which were hazardous because of the crowd.
45. Id. at 492, 88 A.2d at 632.
46. Lee v. National League Baseball Club, 4 Wis. 2d 168, 89 N.W.2d 811(1958) (defendant held negligent in failing to have an usher at his assigned
position when spectators stampeded to recover a foul ball. The usher's absence
Mas held to constitute a "substantial factor" in the ultimate event).
47. Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d 141, 146, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892,
895 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (court sustained recovery from a camp operator by
a child who had been attacked by an intruder).
48. McLeod v. Grant County School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 322,
255 P.2d 360, 364 (1953) (school district authorities held negligent when a child
%%as attacked in the school gym).
49. Mozer v. Semenza, 177 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
50. Feezer & Favour, Intervening Crime and Liability for Negligence, 24
MINN. L. Rav. 635, 642 (1940).
51. Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminal Acts of Third Parties:
The View from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, supra note 30, at 1161. See also
Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 588, 186 A.2d 291, 296 (1962).
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utilized in determining "fairness" are a balancing of the interests of
the parties involved and society in general, examining the nature
and extent of the risk and weighing the feasibility of the suggested
solution.- The Supreme Court of Michigan, however, rather mechan-
ically applied negligence principles to the facts, thereby making a
decision that may well have a significant impact on landlord-tenant
relations without openly considering important policy implications.
Despite the importance of policy implications, surprisingly few
landlord-tenant cases have discussed such factors as reasonableness
and fairness.53 In blighted urban neighborhoods the crime rate is
typically very high, the total number of crimes being highest in less
affluent neighborhoods, where the custom of providing any meaning-
ful security services is virtually non-existent. 4 Johnston implicitly
holds that the landlord is the person who should appropriately bear
the cost of crime, even though the increased costs for the landlord
will inevitably result in increased rent for the tenant. The court in
Kline noted that better protection had been provided to the tenants
previously and admitted that the landlord would be justified in
passing on the cost of increased security; but the tenants in Kline
were in an income bracket that could afford an increase in rent to pay
for the increased protection. Johnston did not make such a concession,
probably because this was a low-income housing area where the
tenants could not afford any increase in rent. Individuals moving
into a building generally know the amount of security that is pro-
vided for the amount of rent they pay. Perhaps the court should
have noted the standard of protection in comparably-priced apart-
ments of the same character and type within the community."5
It should be noted here, however, that the cost of the improvements
provided for by Johnston, a new lock on the front door and adequate
52. It is generally agreed among commentators that tort liability ultimately
rests on a balancing of several factors, including: (1) the economic burden that
liability would impose upon defendant; (2) the extent to which the risk, is one
normally incident to the activity; (3) the relative capacity of the parties to bear
the loss; (4) the public interest in preventing future injuries; and (5) administra-
tive convenience. Comment, Landowner Owes Invitee No Duty to Provide Police
Protection Against Criminal Attack, 63 COLUmn. L. Rzv. 766, 768 (1963).
53. Discussed in Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 619, 643 (1966).
54. See Landlords Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminal Acts of Third
Parties: The View from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, supra note 30, at 1183-84
nn.187-89 and accompanying text.
55. This standard was noted in the dissent in Kline, 349 F.2d at 491-93.
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porch and vestibule lighting, may be nominal. But no matter how
nominal, the people who must bear the cost of the increased security
and protection are those who can least afford it.
Judge Brennan, in his dissent in the Johnston case, took the view
that public safety is the business of the government and that the cost
of security in high-crime areas should not be transferred to the "un-
fortunate owners of real property in such places."5 6 One court has
suggested that it is the legislature's job to protect tenants from the
high rise in the crime rate.5- But another court refused to interfere
with the legislative-executive decisions of how the resources of the
(ommunity may be deployed for the proper protection of the people.5 8
It is clear that Johnston v. Harris was another in a growing series
of cases seeking to advance the landlord-tenant relationship beyond
its common law origins. Johnston went further than any previous
case to impose liability on a landlord for negligent breach of duty to
his tenant to provide reasonable protection against third-party crim-
inal acts. It went one step further than Kline which held that a tenant
may rely upon the maintenance of that degree of security and pro-
tection employed by the landlord when the tenant became a resident
on the premises. Johnston held that the landlord owed a duty to pro-
vide reasonable security, and may even require that a landlord affirm-
atively improve the premises after the tenant occupies if put on notice
that there is a high-crime rate in the area.
Terry L. Kaye
56. 387 Mich. at 576, 198 N.W.2d at 411.
57. DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 955, 266 N.Y.S.2d
463, 467 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1965). Great Britain and California have enacted
legislation to provide financial assistance from state funds to victims of crimes of
violence and to families of murder victims, thus recognizing that victims of crim-
inal attacks are usually without a civil remedy. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 619, 626
(1966).
58. New York City Housing Authority v. Jackson, 58 Misc. 2d 847, 851, 296
N.Y.S.2d 237, 241 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968).
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